Warconomy publishes 7 active forecasts across 6 domains: conflict, sanctions, shipping and chokepoints, energy, humanitarian displacement, and macroeconomic consequences. Each names a measurable target, a resolution source, a horizon, its assumptions, the leading indicators worth watching, and the specific conditions that would prove it wrong. Probabilities are published only as coarse bands with stated numeric meanings, never as decimal percentages, because the reference class of comparable past events is too small to justify that precision. Forecasts that rest on weak or fast-moving sources say so explicitly and carry provisional evidence status.
- Every forecast names the published source that will decide it — no forecast resolves on Warconomy's own say-so.
- Issued forecasts are immutable; revisions create new records and the originals stay public.
- Weak sources are used where they improve coverage, always labeled and never as the resolution source.
- Warconomy does not forecast casualty counts — see the forecasting policy for the hard limits.
What each label means
Warconomy separates what kind of value something is from how well-established it is. Forecast cards below carry both.
Full definitions: observed vs. modeled values.
Active forecasts
Conflict & escalation
OHCHR reports at least one month in H2 2026 above the H1 2026 monthly average
Warconomy forecast: very likely (roughly 80-95%)
At least one month between July and December 2026 records verified civilian casualties above the January-June 2026 monthly average of roughly 1,562
Watch: OHCHR's monthly Protection of Civilians releases
Would be wrong if: A ceasefire or negotiated halt to long-range strikes on urban areas.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Sanctions & export controls
EU adopts a 21st Russia sanctions package by 30 September 2026
Warconomy forecast: likely (roughly 60-80%)
The Council of the EU formally adopts a package publicly designated as the 21st package of restrictive measures against Russia, on or before 30 September 2026
Watch: COREPER agenda items referencing the 21st package
Would be wrong if: The Commission formally withdraws or renumbers the 9 June 2026 proposal.
⚠ Uses a weak or provisional source — see the forecast page for the disclosure.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Shipping & chokepoints
Suez transit volumes remain far below the pre-2024 baseline through 2026
Warconomy forecast: very likely (roughly 80-95%)
Suez Canal monthly transits for December 2026 remain at least 25% below the comparable pre-disruption 2023 monthly baseline
Watch: Monthly Suez Canal Authority transit counts
Would be wrong if: A comprehensive, durable security settlement in the Red Sea prompting all major carriers to restore default Suez routing.
⚠ Uses a weak or provisional source — see the forecast page for the disclosure.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Strait of Hormuz daily transits stay below pre-crisis levels through October 2026
Warconomy forecast: likely (roughly 60-80%)
Average daily Hormuz ship transits during October 2026 remain below 100 per day (the reported pre-crisis level)
Watch: Whether the 60-day negotiating window from the June memorandum produces a permanent agreement
Would be wrong if: A permanent U.S.-Iran settlement with verified free transit and a rapid traffic normalization.
⚠ Uses a weak or provisional source — see the forecast page for the disclosure.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Energy & commodities
EIA revises its 4Q2026 Brent forecast upward in the August 2026 STEO
Warconomy forecast: likely (roughly 60-80%)
The August 2026 STEO's 4Q2026 Brent forecast is higher than the July 2026 STEO's figure of $70.00/b
Watch: Whether Hormuz vessel-strike reporting is corroborated by state or IMO-affiliated bodies rather than remaining single-sourced
Would be wrong if: The reported July 2026 Hormuz re-escalation proves to be substantially inaccurate or is quickly and durably resolved.
⚠ Uses a weak or provisional source — see the forecast page for the disclosure.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Humanitarian & displacement
Sudan IDP count stays above 8 million in IOM DTM's next published round
Warconomy forecast: very likely (roughly 80-95%)
IOM DTM's next published Sudan displacement round reports a national IDP total above 8,000,000
Watch: New displacement reporting from Al Fasher, North Darfur, the Kordofan region, and Blue Nile state
Would be wrong if: A comprehensive ceasefire prompting mass returns at a pace far exceeding the observed trend.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Macroeconomic & fiscal
The next Ukraine RDNA raises the ten-year reconstruction estimate above $588 billion
Warconomy forecast: very likely (roughly 80-95%)
The next published RDNA edition estimates total ten-year needs above $588 billion
Watch: Continued strikes on energy, transport and housing — the three largest RDNA5 needs sectors
Would be wrong if: A durable ceasefire early enough that new damage is minimal and cost inflation is offset.
Full forecast, sources & methodology →All active forecasts (accessible table)
| Forecast | Prediction | Issued | Resolves by | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU adopts a 21st Russia sanctions package by 30 September 2026 | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | September 30, 2026 | reported |
| Suez transit volumes remain far below the pre-2024 baseline through 2026 | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | January 31, 2027 | reported |
| EIA revises its 4Q2026 Brent forecast upward in the August 2026 STEO | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | August 31, 2026 | provisional |
| Sudan IDP count stays above 8 million in IOM DTM's next published round | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | March 31, 2027 | reported |
| OHCHR reports at least one month in H2 2026 above the H1 2026 monthly average | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | February 15, 2027 | reported |
| The next Ukraine RDNA raises the ten-year reconstruction estimate above $588 billion | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | December 31, 2027 | reported |
| Strait of Hormuz daily transits stay below pre-crisis levels through October 2026 | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | November 30, 2026 | provisional |
Nearing resolution
No forecast is within its final review window yet. The earliest resolution date in the current portfolio is 31 August 2026 (the EIA August STEO revision).
Recently revised
No forecast in this portfolio has been revised yet — all 7 are still in their originally issued form. When Warconomy revises a view, the original record stays published and is linked from its replacement, so you can always see what was said before.
Resolved forecasts
No live forecast has resolved yet. The 2 resolved records below are hindcast demonstrations — historical forecasts reconstructed under strict data cutoffs to show how scoring works. They are not evidence of predictive skill and are excluded from live performance counts.
Hindcast: would a naive 'no revision' rule have predicted the EIA's July 2026 Brent cut?
Warconomy forecast: very likely (roughly 80-95%)
The July 2026 STEO revises its 2026 annual Brent forecast DOWNWARD from the June 2026 STEO figure of $95.39/b
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Hindcast: would trend continuation have beaten 'no change' on Sudan's IDP total?
Warconomy forecast: 8,500,000–9,500,000
IOM DTM's March 2026 round reports a national IDP total below 9.5 million
Full forecast, sources & methodology →Full scoring detail: the track record.
Scenarios
Scenarios are not forecasts. They are conditional paths under stated assumptions, carry no probability, and are never presented as the expected outcome.
These are alternative conditional paths, not a ranked prediction — none is presented as the most likely outcome.
- Security and humanitarian access conditions do not materially improve through end-2026.
- The pace of return roughly stalls relative to the 2025-2026 trend.
This is one of two illustrative conditional paths shown side by side (see the de-escalation scenario) — neither is presented as Warconomy's expected outcome; the Forecast record above is Warconomy's actual baseline projection.
- A ceasefire or significant security improvement occurs within the horizon.
- Returns accelerate materially beyond the 2025-2026 trend as access improves.
This is one of two illustrative conditional paths shown side by side (see the continued-conflict scenario) — neither is presented as Warconomy's expected outcome; the Forecast record above is Warconomy's actual baseline projection.
What the probabilities mean
Warconomy publishes probability only in five coarse bands. A figure like “63.27%” would imply a calibration sample that does not exist for most conflict-economic events.
| Band | Numeric meaning |
|---|---|
| very unlikely | roughly 5-20% |
| unlikely | roughly 20-40% |
| roughly even | roughly 40-60% |
| likely | roughly 60-80% |
| very likely | roughly 80-95% |
Range forecasts use a plausible range unless explicitly labeled a statistical confidence or credible interval — the distinction is always stated.
Methods, sources and policy
- How Warconomy makes forecasts — the models in production, uncertainty construction, and baseline comparison.
- Responsible forecasting policy — weak-source rules, immutability, scoring, and the hard limits on casualty, conflict and market forecasting.
- Observed vs. modeled values — the seven epistemic classes used sitewide.
- Track record — lifecycle counts and hindcast demonstrations, honest from launch.
- Source registry — every source behind these forecasts.
Machine-readable
/forecasts/data.json (all records) · /forecasts/active.json · /forecasts/resolved.json · /methods/models/data.json (model registry)
Each record carries its issue date, data cutoff, resolution criteria, evidence status, model version, source IDs, and lifecycle status. No keys, no rate limits.