Warconomy has issued 8 live forecasts, of which 7 are active and 0 have resolved. Because the first portfolio was issued in July 2026 and the earliest resolution date falls after that, no live forecast has yet been scored. Rather than publish an invented accuracy figure, this page reports the raw lifecycle counts, explains exactly how scoring will work, and publishes 2 hindcast demonstrations — historical forecasts reconstructed under strict data cutoffs — each compared against a naive baseline. Hindcasts are excluded from live performance because they were built knowing the outcome.
- No invented accuracy percentage is published anywhere on this site.
- Hindcasts are labeled as demonstrations and never counted as live predictive skill.
- Every model must beat a simple naive baseline to be worth running.
- Forecasts that cannot be measured are marked unresolvable and excluded from scoring, not quietly dropped.
Lifecycle counts
| Status | Count |
|---|---|
| Issued (live forecasts) | 8 |
| Active | 7 |
| Nearing resolution | 0 |
| Resolved | 0 |
| Invalidated | 0 |
| Unresolvable | 0 |
| Superseded | 1 |
| Expired | 0 |
| Withdrawn | 0 |
| Hindcast demonstrations (not live) | 2 |
How forecasts will be scored
Each forecast names, at issue time, the exact criteria and published source that decide it. When that source publishes, the outcome is attached to the original record without altering the prediction. Scoring uses:
- Directional accuracy — did the predicted direction happen?
- Interval coverage — for range forecasts, did the outcome fall inside the published range?
- Brier score — for probability forecasts, squared error against the outcome (0 is perfect, 0.25 is a coin flip).
- Baseline comparison — every forecast is measured against a naive baseline (no-change, no-revision, or persistence). Beating the baseline is the minimum bar for a model to be worth running.
Where an outcome cannot be measured, the forecast is marked unresolvable with a stated reason and excluded from scoring rather than judged against a substitute measure. Full rules: the forecasting policy.
Hindcast demonstrations
Hindcast: would a naive 'no revision' rule have predicted the EIA's July 2026 Brent cut?
Cutoff · resolved · 18-day horizon
| Forecast said | very likely (roughly 80-95%) |
|---|---|
| What happened | The July 2026 STEO (released 7 July 2026) cut the 2026 annual Brent average to $81.91/b from $95.39/b — a downward revision of about $13.48/b, explicitly attributed by the EIA to increased oil flows through the reopened strait. |
| Naive baseline | The July STEO repeats the June figure of $95.39/b (no revision). |
| Result | Forecast correct; baseline wrong. The model beat its baseline. Brier score 0.0225. |
Hindcast: would trend continuation have beaten 'no change' on Sudan's IDP total?
Cutoff · resolved · 425-day horizon
| Forecast said | 8,500,000–9,500,000 |
|---|---|
| What happened | DTM's 29 March 2026 round recorded an estimated 8,936,175 IDPs — a 23% decline from the peak, inside the forecast's 8.5-9.5 million plausible range. The no-change baseline was wrong by roughly 2.65 million. |
| Naive baseline | The March 2026 total remains at the January 2025 peak of 11,585,384. |
| Result | Forecast correct; baseline wrong. The model beat its baseline. The published range covered the outcome. |
2 of 2 hindcasts beat their naive baseline. With a sample this small, that is a demonstration of method, not evidence of skill.
Forecasts awaiting resolution
| Forecast | Prediction | Issued | Resolves by |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU adopts a 21st Russia sanctions package by 30 September 2026 | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | September 30, 2026 |
| Suez transit volumes remain far below the pre-2024 baseline through 2026 | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | January 31, 2027 |
| EIA revises its 4Q2026 Brent forecast upward in the August 2026 STEO | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | August 31, 2026 |
| Sudan IDP count stays above 8 million in IOM DTM's next published round | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | March 31, 2027 |
| OHCHR reports at least one month in H2 2026 above the H1 2026 monthly average | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | February 15, 2027 |
| The next Ukraine RDNA raises the ten-year reconstruction estimate above $588 billion | very likely (roughly 80-95%) | July 18, 2026 | December 31, 2027 |
| Strait of Hormuz daily transits stay below pre-crisis levels through October 2026 | likely (roughly 60-80%) | July 18, 2026 | November 30, 2026 |
Machine-readable
All forecasts · Active only · Resolved only · Model registry