Human capital

War, population & economic scarring

How war's human toll — lives lost, people wounded and displaced, families separated — becomes a decades-long economic burden through lost labour, care needs and slower growth. Demographic context from the World Bank; not casualty data, not real-time.

People firstWar destroys lives, families and communities before it touches any ledger. The losses described here are first of all human and moral. The economics that follow explain the long burden a society carries — they do not measure the worth of any person. Casualty, wounded and displacement figures are uncertain and contested; Warconomy does not publish its own, and links instead to specialist sources.

War's deepest costs are human: people killed and wounded, families separated, communities uprooted. Those losses also leave a long economic shadow. An economy depends on people — their work, skills, health and care — so when war removes working-age people through death, lasting injury or flight abroad, it shrinks the workforce for a generation while raising the need for health, disability and reconstruction spending. This page explains those channels in plain language and shows official World Bank demographic context. It treats estimates of human loss as estimates, and never attributes a demographic change to war.

  • Working-age population loss lowers the labour force for decades.
  • Displacement and brain drain remove skills, sometimes permanently.
  • Veterans, disability and trauma create long-term care obligations — first a duty, also a cost.
  • Fertility and family formation can fall, reshaping the future population.
  • Warconomy shows demographic context, not casualty data; estimates belong to cited specialist sources.

Start with the human cost

Before it is an economic story, war is a human one. It kills and wounds people, tears families apart, and forces millions from their homes. Those losses are first of all personal and moral, not statistical. This page does not reduce people to numbers; it explains how the suffering war causes also leaves a long economic shadow — one that can shape a country's recovery for decades.

Why the human toll scars economies for decades

An economy runs on people — their work, skills, health and care for one another. When a war removes working-age people through death, lasting injury or flight abroad, it shrinks the workforce and the pool of skills, often for a generation. At the same time it raises the need for public spending on health, disability care, pensions for the bereaved, and rebuilding. Fewer producers and greater needs at once is the core of what economists call human-capital scarring.

Working-age population loss

Deaths and serious injuries fall heavily on young and working-age adults, the part of the population that produces most and supports both children and the elderly. Losing them lowers the labour force not just now but for decades, because those workers — and often the children they would have had — are gone from the future economy too.

Displacement, refugees and brain drain

War displaces people inside their own country and across borders. Those who leave take their skills and education with them; if they do not return, the origin country loses that human capital for good — a 'brain drain' that is hard to reverse. Host countries face pressures but can also gain workers. Whether people return, and when, is deeply uncertain.

Veterans, disability and trauma

Many who survive carry lasting wounds — amputations and other physical disabilities, and the unseen injuries of trauma and PTSD. Caring for them is first a duty owed to people who served and suffered. It also creates long-term obligations: medical care, rehabilitation, prosthetics, disability support and the unpaid work of families, alongside the lost earnings of those who cannot fully return to work.

Family formation, fertility and the future

War separates couples, delays marriages and births, and makes people fearful of the future — all of which can lower fertility for years. Combined with deaths among young adults, this can leave a smaller, older population, reshaping the labour force, pensions and growth long after the fighting ends. The size of these effects is uncertain and varies by country.

What Warconomy can measure now — and what it cannot

Warconomy shows official World Bank demographic and labour indicators as context — population, labour force, fertility, migration and GDP — clearly labelled and not attributed to any war. It does NOT publish casualty, wounded or displacement counts of its own: those are uncertain, contested and best read from specialist sources (UNHCR, IOM, UN, UCDP and peer-reviewed research), which the briefings link to. Treat estimates as estimates, never as certainties.

Demographic context (World Bank)

These are official World Bank demographic, labour and macro indicators — not casualty, wounded or displacement counts. They are annual, often lagged, with the latest year differing by country and series, and no change shown here is attributed to war. Accessed June 24, 2026; source-reported. See the World Bank source.

Population & fertility

EconomyTotal population
people
Population ages 15–64
people
Fertility rate
births per woman
Ukraine37.9M
2024
25.4M
2024
1
2024
Russia143.5M
2024
94.1M
2024
1.4
2024
Sudan50.4M
2024
28.4M
2024
DR Congo109.3M
2024
55.6M
2024
6
2024
Ethiopia132.1M
2024
76.2M
2024
3.9
2024
Syria16.3M
2024
Iraq46M
2024
27.6M
2024
3.2
2024
Yemen40.6M
2024
22.9M
2024
4.5
2024
Israel10M
2024
6M
2024
2.9
2024
Iran91.6M
2024
63.5M
2024
1.7
2024
Lebanon5.8M
2024
2.2
2024
Niger5.9
2024
Mali24.5M
2024
12.6M
2024
5.5
2024
Burkina Faso23.5M
2024
13.1M
2024
4.1
2024

Migration

EconomyNet migration
people (period)
Ukraine
Russia-252k
2025
Sudan291k
2025
DR Congo-27k
2025
Ethiopia24k
2025
Syria422k
2025
Iraq-1k
2025
Yemen-16k
2025
Israel
Iran117k
2025
Lebanon-10k
2025
Niger-8k
2025
Mali-48k
2025
Burkina Faso

Labour force

EconomyLabour force, total
people
Labour-force participation
% of pop 15+
Unemployment
% of labour force
Ukraine20.5M
2021
9.8
2021
Russia72.4M
2025
61.1
2025
Sudan37.5
2022
DR Congo64.3
2025
4.4
2025
Ethiopia56.8M
2025
68.5
2025
3.3
2025
Syria6.8M
2025
36.9
2025
13.6
2025
Iraq12.5M
2025
41.5
2025
15.5
2025
Yemen8.2M
2025
33.1
2025
17.3
2025
Israel4.8M
2025
65.5
2025
3.5
2025
Iran29.5M
2025
41
2025
8.3
2025
Lebanon43.4
2023
11
2023
Niger79.7
2025
0.4
2025
Mali9.2M
2025
67
2025
2.8
2025
Burkina Faso9.9M
2025
70
2025
3.5
2025

Output & income

EconomyGDP per capita
constant 2015 US$
GDP growth
annual %
Ukraine2,219
2024
2.9
2024
Russia11,043
2024
4.3
2024
Sudan578
2024
-14
2024
DR Congo554
2024
6.1
2024
Ethiopia883
2024
Syria712
2022
0.7
2022
Iraq4,180
2024
-1.5
2024
Yemen1,079
2018
0.8
2018
Israel41,845
2024
0.9
2024
Iran5,834
2024
3.7
2024
Lebanon-0.8
2023
Niger595
2024
10.3
2024
Mali910
2024
5
2024
Burkina Faso764
2024
4.8
2024

Fiscal & health

EconomyMilitary expenditure
% of GDP
Health expenditure
% of GDP
Ukraine34.5
2024
Russia7.1
2024
7
2023
Sudan0.9
2021
DR Congo1.2
2024
3.7
2023
Ethiopia0.7
2024
Syria4.1
2010
2.7
2023
Iraq2.4
2024
5.5
2023
Yemen4
2014
9.7
2023
Israel8.8
2024
7.1
2023
Iran2
2024
6
2023
Lebanon2.6
2024
Niger2.2
2024
4
2023
Mali4.2
2024
Burkina Faso4.7
2024
7.8
2023

Population structure & dependency

Age structure shapes an economy: a country with a large working-age share has many people of working age relative to children and older people, while a high dependency ratio means each worker supports more people who are not yet, or no longer, in the labour force. War interacts with these structures — but the figures below are general demographic estimates and are not attributed to any war.

These are demographic estimates (UN World Population Prospects, via the World Bank) — annual, often lagged, and historical (no projections). They are not casualty, wounded or displacement data. Ages 0–14 is derived as total − (15–64) − (65+). Accessed June 24, 2026. See the World Bank source.

How to read this

  • Working-age share (15–64) is the part of the population most likely to be producing and earning.
  • Youth share (0–14) points to a young, growing population; a high share is sometimes called a “youth bulge”.
  • Older share (65+) points to an aging population and rising old-age support needs.
  • Dependency ratio is dependents (under 15 plus 65+) per 100 working-age people — higher means more support pressure on each worker.

Youngest structure

Niger: 46.6% aged 0–14 (2024)

Oldest structure

Ukraine: 19% aged 65+ (2024)

Most dependency pressure

Niger: 96.8325672256489 dependents per 100 workers

Age structure by economy

Each bar shows the share aged 0–14 (children), 15–64 (working-age) and 65+ (older), summing to ~100%. Sorted youngest first.

Niger46.6% / 50.8% / 2.6% · 2024
Mali46.1% / 51.5% / 2.4% · 2024
DR Congo46% / 50.9% / 3.1% · 2024
Burkina Faso41.8% / 55.5% / 2.7% · 2024
Yemen41.1% / 56.3% / 2.5% · 2024
Sudan40.5% / 56.2% / 3.3% · 2024
Ethiopia39.1% / 57.7% / 3.2% · 2024
Iraq36.6% / 60% / 3.4% · 2024
Syria29.2% / 66.1% / 4.7% · 2024
Israel27.4% / 60% / 12.6% · 2024
Lebanon26.2% / 63.7% / 10.1% · 2024
Iran22.4% / 69.3% / 8.2% · 2024
Russia17.3% / 65.5% / 17.2% · 2024
Ukraine13.9% / 67.1% / 19% · 2024

Colour key: children 0–14 · working-age 15–64 · older 65+.

Comparison table

EconomyYear0–1415–6465+Dependency (total)childold
Niger202446.6%50.8%2.6%96.832567225648991.72597875781415.10658846783487
Mali202446.1%51.5%2.4%94.273962167894989.64243682102894.63152534686599
DR Congo202446%50.9%3.1%96.496656664498790.45324829983136.04340836466739
Burkina Faso202441.8%55.5%2.7%80.030316992844275.25632330929214.77399368355209
Yemen202441.1%56.3%2.5%77.46689820399472.98934376431994.47755443967403
Sudan202440.5%56.2%3.3%77.850702177466171.97858231639075.87211986107548
Ethiopia202439.1%57.7%3.2%73.279895167971567.68298141877545.59691374919611
Iraq202436.6%60%3.4%60.96458225981295.69024220068562
Syria202429.2%66.1%4.7%51.297715690718544.12361510929017.17410058142843
Israel202427.4%60%12.6%66.561046416968745.653146439762620.9078999772061
Lebanon202426.2%63.7%10.1%57.047589293321941.12517227061815.9224170227039
Iran202422.4%69.3%8.2%44.257647592909432.372240998428111.8854065944813
Russia202417.3%65.5%17.2%52.568840417572226.361365329589526.2074750879828
Ukraine202413.9%67.1%19%48.922509061366520.683154618187528.239354443179

Why it matters: age structure shapes the labour force, the support burden on workers, and long-run growth — and war can deepen those pressures through loss, displacement and lower fertility. This is context, not a causal claim. Machine-readable in /human-capital/data.json.

What this does not show

  • It does not show casualties, wounded, or displaced people — those estimates are uncertain and live on cited specialist sources, not here.
  • It does not attribute any demographic or economic change to war; many forces shape these indicators.
  • It is not real-time and makes no forecast; values are annual and often lagged.
  • It offers no investment, medical, legal or policy advice.

Read the briefings

Related briefings

Source-reviewed explainers (not live news) that put this page in context.

  • Military losses and the long shadow on labour and growthWar removes working-age people through death, lasting injury and flight abroad, and mobilisation pulls workers from the civilian economy. This explains how that can weigh on the labour force and future growth — with honest uncertainty about the human numbers.
  • Wounded veterans, disability and the long economic burdenWar leaves many survivors with lasting physical and psychological injuries. This explains the long-term channels — medical care, rehabilitation, disability support, family caregiving and lost earnings — with a dignity-first framing.
  • Trauma, PTSD and the cost of post-war recoveryWar leaves psychological as well as physical wounds. This explains how trauma and PTSD can weigh on recovery — through health-system demand, productivity and family burden — while stressing that individual outcomes vary widely.
  • Refugees, migration and brain drain in war economiesWar displaces people inside and beyond borders. This explains the economic channels — lost labour and skills at home, remittances, host-country effects, and uncertain return — without treating displaced people as mere inputs.
  • War, fertility and the shape of future populationsWar can lower fertility and delay family formation through separation, loss and insecurity. This explains how that, with deaths among young adults, can leave a smaller, older population — stressing the deep uncertainty involved.
  • Sudan's war: displacement, food and the road to recoverySudan's war has caused mass displacement and severe food insecurity. This explains the human-capital and recovery channels — lost livelihoods, disrupted farming and a heavy humanitarian burden — pointing to UN and FAO/WFP reporting for the figures.
  • Conflict in DRC: mining labour, displacement and supply chainsConflict in eastern DRC displaces people and shapes mining livelihoods that feed global supply chains. This explains the displacement, labour and trade-disruption channels, with a careful critical-minerals caveat.
  • Gaza: human capital, displacement and reconstructionWar can destroy not just buildings but human capital — health, education and skills. This explains how destruction, displacement and damaged services weigh on Gaza's recovery, pointing to UN and World Bank assessments for figures.
  • Syria: war, migration and a decade of lost growthProlonged war can scar growth for a decade or more through refugee outflows, interrupted schooling and destroyed capital. This explains those long-run channels, pointing to UNHCR/IOM and research for the figures.
  • The Sahel: young populations, conflict and migrationThe Sahel's young, fast-growing populations face conflict that disrupts work and schooling and drives migration. This explains the youth-employment, migration and state-capacity channels, with mining and trade links and careful caveats.

Machine-readable: /human-capital/data.json. See also conflict economies, reconstruction, and the free data sources roadmap.