War's deepest costs are human: people killed and wounded, families separated, communities uprooted. Those losses also leave a long economic shadow. An economy depends on people — their work, skills, health and care — so when war removes working-age people through death, lasting injury or flight abroad, it shrinks the workforce for a generation while raising the need for health, disability and reconstruction spending. This page explains those channels in plain language and shows official World Bank demographic context. It treats estimates of human loss as estimates, and never attributes a demographic change to war.
- Working-age population loss lowers the labour force for decades.
- Displacement and brain drain remove skills, sometimes permanently.
- Veterans, disability and trauma create long-term care obligations — first a duty, also a cost.
- Fertility and family formation can fall, reshaping the future population.
- Warconomy shows demographic context, not casualty data; estimates belong to cited specialist sources.
Start with the human cost
Before it is an economic story, war is a human one. It kills and wounds people, tears families apart, and forces millions from their homes. Those losses are first of all personal and moral, not statistical. This page does not reduce people to numbers; it explains how the suffering war causes also leaves a long economic shadow — one that can shape a country's recovery for decades.
Why the human toll scars economies for decades
An economy runs on people — their work, skills, health and care for one another. When a war removes working-age people through death, lasting injury or flight abroad, it shrinks the workforce and the pool of skills, often for a generation. At the same time it raises the need for public spending on health, disability care, pensions for the bereaved, and rebuilding. Fewer producers and greater needs at once is the core of what economists call human-capital scarring.
Working-age population loss
Deaths and serious injuries fall heavily on young and working-age adults, the part of the population that produces most and supports both children and the elderly. Losing them lowers the labour force not just now but for decades, because those workers — and often the children they would have had — are gone from the future economy too.
Displacement, refugees and brain drain
War displaces people inside their own country and across borders. Those who leave take their skills and education with them; if they do not return, the origin country loses that human capital for good — a 'brain drain' that is hard to reverse. Host countries face pressures but can also gain workers. Whether people return, and when, is deeply uncertain.
Veterans, disability and trauma
Many who survive carry lasting wounds — amputations and other physical disabilities, and the unseen injuries of trauma and PTSD. Caring for them is first a duty owed to people who served and suffered. It also creates long-term obligations: medical care, rehabilitation, prosthetics, disability support and the unpaid work of families, alongside the lost earnings of those who cannot fully return to work.
Family formation, fertility and the future
War separates couples, delays marriages and births, and makes people fearful of the future — all of which can lower fertility for years. Combined with deaths among young adults, this can leave a smaller, older population, reshaping the labour force, pensions and growth long after the fighting ends. The size of these effects is uncertain and varies by country.
What Warconomy can measure now — and what it cannot
Warconomy shows official World Bank demographic and labour indicators as context — population, labour force, fertility, migration and GDP — clearly labelled and not attributed to any war. It does NOT publish casualty, wounded or displacement counts of its own: those are uncertain, contested and best read from specialist sources (UNHCR, IOM, UN, UCDP and peer-reviewed research), which the briefings link to. Treat estimates as estimates, never as certainties.
Demographic context (World Bank)
Population & fertility
| Economy | Total population people | Population ages 15–64 people | Fertility rate births per woman |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 37.9M 2024 | 25.4M 2024 | 1 2024 |
| Russia | 143.5M 2024 | 94.1M 2024 | 1.4 2024 |
| Sudan | 50.4M 2024 | 28.4M 2024 | — |
| DR Congo | 109.3M 2024 | 55.6M 2024 | 6 2024 |
| Ethiopia | 132.1M 2024 | 76.2M 2024 | 3.9 2024 |
| Syria | — | 16.3M 2024 | — |
| Iraq | 46M 2024 | 27.6M 2024 | 3.2 2024 |
| Yemen | 40.6M 2024 | 22.9M 2024 | 4.5 2024 |
| Israel | 10M 2024 | 6M 2024 | 2.9 2024 |
| Iran | 91.6M 2024 | 63.5M 2024 | 1.7 2024 |
| Lebanon | 5.8M 2024 | — | 2.2 2024 |
| Niger | — | — | 5.9 2024 |
| Mali | 24.5M 2024 | 12.6M 2024 | 5.5 2024 |
| Burkina Faso | 23.5M 2024 | 13.1M 2024 | 4.1 2024 |
Migration
| Economy | Net migration people (period) |
|---|---|
| Ukraine | — |
| Russia | -252k 2025 |
| Sudan | 291k 2025 |
| DR Congo | -27k 2025 |
| Ethiopia | 24k 2025 |
| Syria | 422k 2025 |
| Iraq | -1k 2025 |
| Yemen | -16k 2025 |
| Israel | — |
| Iran | 117k 2025 |
| Lebanon | -10k 2025 |
| Niger | -8k 2025 |
| Mali | -48k 2025 |
| Burkina Faso | — |
Labour force
| Economy | Labour force, total people | Labour-force participation % of pop 15+ | Unemployment % of labour force |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 20.5M 2021 | — | 9.8 2021 |
| Russia | 72.4M 2025 | 61.1 2025 | — |
| Sudan | — | 37.5 2022 | — |
| DR Congo | — | 64.3 2025 | 4.4 2025 |
| Ethiopia | 56.8M 2025 | 68.5 2025 | 3.3 2025 |
| Syria | 6.8M 2025 | 36.9 2025 | 13.6 2025 |
| Iraq | 12.5M 2025 | 41.5 2025 | 15.5 2025 |
| Yemen | 8.2M 2025 | 33.1 2025 | 17.3 2025 |
| Israel | 4.8M 2025 | 65.5 2025 | 3.5 2025 |
| Iran | 29.5M 2025 | 41 2025 | 8.3 2025 |
| Lebanon | — | 43.4 2023 | 11 2023 |
| Niger | — | 79.7 2025 | 0.4 2025 |
| Mali | 9.2M 2025 | 67 2025 | 2.8 2025 |
| Burkina Faso | 9.9M 2025 | 70 2025 | 3.5 2025 |
Output & income
| Economy | GDP per capita constant 2015 US$ | GDP growth annual % |
|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 2,219 2024 | 2.9 2024 |
| Russia | 11,043 2024 | 4.3 2024 |
| Sudan | 578 2024 | -14 2024 |
| DR Congo | 554 2024 | 6.1 2024 |
| Ethiopia | 883 2024 | — |
| Syria | 712 2022 | 0.7 2022 |
| Iraq | 4,180 2024 | -1.5 2024 |
| Yemen | 1,079 2018 | 0.8 2018 |
| Israel | 41,845 2024 | 0.9 2024 |
| Iran | 5,834 2024 | 3.7 2024 |
| Lebanon | — | -0.8 2023 |
| Niger | 595 2024 | 10.3 2024 |
| Mali | 910 2024 | 5 2024 |
| Burkina Faso | 764 2024 | 4.8 2024 |
Fiscal & health
| Economy | Military expenditure % of GDP | Health expenditure % of GDP |
|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 34.5 2024 | — |
| Russia | 7.1 2024 | 7 2023 |
| Sudan | 0.9 2021 | — |
| DR Congo | 1.2 2024 | 3.7 2023 |
| Ethiopia | 0.7 2024 | — |
| Syria | 4.1 2010 | 2.7 2023 |
| Iraq | 2.4 2024 | 5.5 2023 |
| Yemen | 4 2014 | 9.7 2023 |
| Israel | 8.8 2024 | 7.1 2023 |
| Iran | 2 2024 | 6 2023 |
| Lebanon | 2.6 2024 | — |
| Niger | 2.2 2024 | 4 2023 |
| Mali | 4.2 2024 | — |
| Burkina Faso | 4.7 2024 | 7.8 2023 |
Population structure & dependency
Age structure shapes an economy: a country with a large working-age share has many people of working age relative to children and older people, while a high dependency ratio means each worker supports more people who are not yet, or no longer, in the labour force. War interacts with these structures — but the figures below are general demographic estimates and are not attributed to any war.
How to read this
- Working-age share (15–64) is the part of the population most likely to be producing and earning.
- Youth share (0–14) points to a young, growing population; a high share is sometimes called a “youth bulge”.
- Older share (65+) points to an aging population and rising old-age support needs.
- Dependency ratio is dependents (under 15 plus 65+) per 100 working-age people — higher means more support pressure on each worker.
Youngest structure
Niger: 46.6% aged 0–14 (2024)
Oldest structure
Ukraine: 19% aged 65+ (2024)
Most dependency pressure
Niger: 96.8325672256489 dependents per 100 workers
Age structure by economy
Each bar shows the share aged 0–14 (children), 15–64 (working-age) and 65+ (older), summing to ~100%. Sorted youngest first.
Colour key: children 0–14 · working-age 15–64 · older 65+.
Comparison table
| Economy | Year | 0–14 | 15–64 | 65+ | Dependency (total) | child | old |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Niger | 2024 | 46.6% | 50.8% | 2.6% | 96.8325672256489 | 91.7259787578141 | 5.10658846783487 |
| Mali | 2024 | 46.1% | 51.5% | 2.4% | 94.2739621678949 | 89.6424368210289 | 4.63152534686599 |
| DR Congo | 2024 | 46% | 50.9% | 3.1% | 96.4966566644987 | 90.4532482998313 | 6.04340836466739 |
| Burkina Faso | 2024 | 41.8% | 55.5% | 2.7% | 80.0303169928442 | 75.2563233092921 | 4.77399368355209 |
| Yemen | 2024 | 41.1% | 56.3% | 2.5% | 77.466898203994 | 72.9893437643199 | 4.47755443967403 |
| Sudan | 2024 | 40.5% | 56.2% | 3.3% | 77.8507021774661 | 71.9785823163907 | 5.87211986107548 |
| Ethiopia | 2024 | 39.1% | 57.7% | 3.2% | 73.2798951679715 | 67.6829814187754 | 5.59691374919611 |
| Iraq | 2024 | 36.6% | 60% | 3.4% | — | 60.9645822598129 | 5.69024220068562 |
| Syria | 2024 | 29.2% | 66.1% | 4.7% | 51.2977156907185 | 44.1236151092901 | 7.17410058142843 |
| Israel | 2024 | 27.4% | 60% | 12.6% | 66.5610464169687 | 45.6531464397626 | 20.9078999772061 |
| Lebanon | 2024 | 26.2% | 63.7% | 10.1% | 57.0475892933219 | 41.125172270618 | 15.9224170227039 |
| Iran | 2024 | 22.4% | 69.3% | 8.2% | 44.2576475929094 | 32.3722409984281 | 11.8854065944813 |
| Russia | 2024 | 17.3% | 65.5% | 17.2% | 52.5688404175722 | 26.3613653295895 | 26.2074750879828 |
| Ukraine | 2024 | 13.9% | 67.1% | 19% | 48.9225090613665 | 20.6831546181875 | 28.239354443179 |
Why it matters: age structure shapes the labour force, the support burden on workers, and long-run growth — and war can deepen those pressures through loss, displacement and lower fertility. This is context, not a causal claim. Machine-readable in /human-capital/data.json.
What this does not show
- It does not show casualties, wounded, or displaced people — those estimates are uncertain and live on cited specialist sources, not here.
- It does not attribute any demographic or economic change to war; many forces shape these indicators.
- It is not real-time and makes no forecast; values are annual and often lagged.
- It offers no investment, medical, legal or policy advice.
Read the briefings
Related briefings
Source-reviewed explainers (not live news) that put this page in context.
- Military losses and the long shadow on labour and growth — War removes working-age people through death, lasting injury and flight abroad, and mobilisation pulls workers from the civilian economy. This explains how that can weigh on the labour force and future growth — with honest uncertainty about the human numbers.
- Wounded veterans, disability and the long economic burden — War leaves many survivors with lasting physical and psychological injuries. This explains the long-term channels — medical care, rehabilitation, disability support, family caregiving and lost earnings — with a dignity-first framing.
- Trauma, PTSD and the cost of post-war recovery — War leaves psychological as well as physical wounds. This explains how trauma and PTSD can weigh on recovery — through health-system demand, productivity and family burden — while stressing that individual outcomes vary widely.
- Refugees, migration and brain drain in war economies — War displaces people inside and beyond borders. This explains the economic channels — lost labour and skills at home, remittances, host-country effects, and uncertain return — without treating displaced people as mere inputs.
- War, fertility and the shape of future populations — War can lower fertility and delay family formation through separation, loss and insecurity. This explains how that, with deaths among young adults, can leave a smaller, older population — stressing the deep uncertainty involved.
- Sudan's war: displacement, food and the road to recovery — Sudan's war has caused mass displacement and severe food insecurity. This explains the human-capital and recovery channels — lost livelihoods, disrupted farming and a heavy humanitarian burden — pointing to UN and FAO/WFP reporting for the figures.
- Conflict in DRC: mining labour, displacement and supply chains — Conflict in eastern DRC displaces people and shapes mining livelihoods that feed global supply chains. This explains the displacement, labour and trade-disruption channels, with a careful critical-minerals caveat.
- Gaza: human capital, displacement and reconstruction — War can destroy not just buildings but human capital — health, education and skills. This explains how destruction, displacement and damaged services weigh on Gaza's recovery, pointing to UN and World Bank assessments for figures.
- Syria: war, migration and a decade of lost growth — Prolonged war can scar growth for a decade or more through refugee outflows, interrupted schooling and destroyed capital. This explains those long-run channels, pointing to UNHCR/IOM and research for the figures.
- The Sahel: young populations, conflict and migration — The Sahel's young, fast-growing populations face conflict that disrupts work and schooling and drives migration. This explains the youth-employment, migration and state-capacity channels, with mining and trade links and careful caveats.
Machine-readable: /human-capital/data.json. See also conflict economies, reconstruction, and the free data sources roadmap.