How the Bab el-Mandeb Strait affects the global economy
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait affects the global economy as the southern gateway of the Red Sea–Suez corridor, through which oil, LNG, and containers move between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Since late 2023, security disruption in the Red Sea has pushed many tankers and container ships off this route and onto the much longer voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The EIA estimates that crude oil and petroleum liquids through Bab el-Mandeb fell to about 3.7 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2025 and 4.3 million in the second — well below pre-disruption levels. The economic effect runs through longer voyages, higher freight and insurance costs, lower Suez Canal traffic, and rerouted energy flows. These are dated EIA quarterly snapshots, manually maintained and not real-time; this page is distinct from the Red Sea container page and is not a causal attribution.
- The southern gateway of the Red Sea–Suez corridor, linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.
- EIA estimates oil transit fell to ~3.7 million b/d (1Q2025) and ~4.3 million b/d (2Q2025) (live/source-linked).
- Red Sea security disruption since late 2023 diverts ships around the Cape of Good Hope.
- Lower flows are associated with higher freight/insurance costs and reduced Suez traffic.
- Indicators are dated EIA quarterly snapshots; not real-time and not a live vessel tracker.
At a glance
Source-linked indicators for this topic. Each card shows its source, as-of date, reviewed date, and confidence — manually maintained from cited public sources, not real-time.
Key economic channels
Oil & LNG transit
A strategic route for oil and LNG between the Gulf/Asia and the Mediterranean; flows have dropped sharply since 2023.
Route diversion
Disruption diverts vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding voyage time, fuel, and effective-capacity tightening.
Freight & insurance
Heightened risk is associated with higher war-risk insurance and freight rates on affected lanes.
Latest indicators
Each value carries its own source, confidence, and data mode. Rows tagged “live · source-linked” are manually maintained from a cited public source (not real-time); rows tagged “sample” are illustrative and pending live coverage.
Live/static indicators are manually maintained from cited public sources and are not real-time. Sample rows remain labeled.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chokepoint oil & petroleum liquids transit | 4.3 million bbl/daylive · source-linked | June 30, 2025 | U.S. Energy Information Administration | High |
| Chokepoint oil & petroleum liquids transit | 3.7 million bbl/daylive · source-linked | March 31, 2025 | U.S. Energy Information Administration | High |
Recent trend
A short, source-linked history of dated snapshots. Not a live chart; the latest snapshot corresponds to the current indicator above.
Bab el-Mandeb oil transit (million bbl/day, quarterly)
| Period | Value | As of | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1Q2025 | 3.7 | March 31, 2025 | EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints |
| 2Q2025 | 4.3 | June 30, 2025 | EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints |
Source-linked facts
Red Sea security disruption since late 2023 has pushed many tankers off the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez route onto the longer voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, lowering oil flows through the strait.
What changed recently
A dated change log for this page, not news.
- DataInitial canonical page with live/source-linked EIA STEO oil-transit estimates for Bab el-Mandeb (1Q2025 ~3.7 and 2Q2025 ~4.3 million b/d).
Data confidence & limitations
The strait's role and the direction of the disruption are well established and rated high confidence. The EIA oil-transit volumes are source-linked quarterly snapshots (high confidence as EIA estimates, ~a year old and recommended for review).
Limitations
- Coverage is partial: the live rows are EIA quarterly oil-transit estimates (1Q–2Q 2025).
- Not real-time; quarterly snapshots that may be revised by the EIA.
- This page focuses on oil/energy transit and is distinct from the Red Sea container-shipping page to avoid duplication.
- Not a live vessel tracker; effects are associative, not a causal attribution.
Sources
| Source | Type | Link |
|---|---|---|
| EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints | Official | www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php |
Frequently asked questions
- How is Bab el-Mandeb different from the Red Sea page?
- This page focuses on oil and energy transit through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (EIA figures), while the Red Sea page covers container-shipping and Suez transit disruption (UNCTAD/IMF). They are kept distinct to avoid duplication.
- Why have flows through Bab el-Mandeb dropped?
- Red Sea security disruption since late 2023 has diverted many tankers around the Cape of Good Hope. The EIA estimates oil transit fell to about 3.7 million b/d (1Q2025) and 4.3 million b/d (2Q2025). These are dated snapshots, not real-time.
Related Warconomy pages
How to cite this page
Cite this page:
Warconomy. "Economic impact of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait." Warconomy, last updated June 5, 2026. https://warconomy.com/chokepoints/bab-el-mandeb/economic-impact
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