{ "name": "Warconomy — forecast archive (active)", "archiveVersion": "1.0.0", "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts", "note": "Warconomy forecasts are model-based predictions that can be wrong. They are decision-support, not advice, and not investment, legal, or policy guidance. Issued forecasts are immutable: a changed view becomes a new record and the original stays published. Hindcasts (isHindcast: true) are strict-cutoff historical demonstrations, never live predictive performance. See /forecasting-policy.", "probabilityBandDefinitions": { "very-unlikely": "roughly 5-20%", "unlikely": "roughly 20-40%", "roughly-even": "roughly 40-60%", "likely": "roughly 60-80%", "very-likely": "roughly 80-95%" }, "manifest": { "archiveVersion": "1.0.0", "generatedFrom": "src/data/forecasts.ts (committed, append-only)", "totalRecords": 10, "liveForecasts": 8, "hindcasts": 2, "active": 7, "resolved": 0, "domains": [ { "domain": "conflict", "count": 1 }, { "domain": "sanctions", "count": 1 }, { "domain": "shipping", "count": 2 }, { "domain": "energy", "count": 1 }, { "domain": "humanitarian", "count": 1 }, { "domain": "macro", "count": 1 } ], "models": [ { "id": "trend-continuation-v1", "version": "1.0" }, { "id": "policy-sequencing-v1", "version": "1.0" }, { "id": "external-forecast-tracking-v1", "version": "1.0" }, { "id": "threshold-persistence-v1", "version": "1.0" } ], "integrityIssues": 0 }, "records": [ { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-eu-21st-package", "slug": "eu-21st-sanctions-package-adoption", "title": "EU adopts a 21st Russia sanctions package by 30 September 2026", "domain": "sanctions", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "reported", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "Legal adoption of an EU sanctions package formally designated the 21st package", "targetEvent": "The Council of the EU formally adopts a package publicly designated as the 21st package of restrictive measures against Russia, on or before 30 September 2026", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if the Council of the EU publishes an adopted legal act (Official Journal publication or an official Council press release announcing adoption) for a package publicly designated the '21st package' against Russia, dated on or before 30 September 2026. A further 'mini' or rolling package that is NOT designated the 21st package does not resolve this TRUE. Resolves FALSE otherwise, including if the package is still under negotiation on that date.", "resolutionSource": "Council of the European Union official press releases and the EU Official Journal", "resolutionDate": "2026-09-30", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-08-15", "horizonDays": 74, "probabilityBand": "likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 60-80%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "The Commission's 9 June 2026 proposal remains on the Council agenda rather than being withdrawn or absorbed into a differently-numbered instrument.", "The EU continues its established pattern of adopting successive numbered packages, having reached the 20th on 23 April 2026.", "The Commission's stated shift to 'rolling' sanctions (evidenced by the 15 June 2026 mini package) supplements rather than replaces numbered packages." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "COREPER agenda items referencing the 21st package", "Public statements by individual member states signalling a reservation or veto intent", "Whether further 'mini'/rolling packages are adopted in the interim, which may reduce urgency for a numbered package" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "The Commission formally withdraws or renumbers the 9 June 2026 proposal.", "A ceasefire or peace settlement materially changes EU sanctions policy direction.", "The EU publicly abandons numbered packages in favour of a purely rolling designation model." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": "Reporting on the internal state of member-state negotiations comes largely from law-firm client alerts and trade-compliance trade press rather than from the Council itself, which does not publish live negotiating positions. Those secondary summaries are used here as directional evidence about process timing only. The forecast RESOLVES solely against the Council's own published legal act — no secondary source can resolve it.", "competingEvidence": [ { "summary": "Evidence for earlier adoption: the Council was reported to be aiming for a decision by around 15 July 2026, which would have made adoption well inside this window.", "sourceId": "eu-council-sanctions" }, { "summary": "Evidence for delay or failure: the 20th package was itself described in trade-compliance coverage as breaking a deadlock, indicating that member-state blocking is a live and recurring risk rather than a theoretical one. The reported mid-July target had not produced an adopted 21st package as of this forecast's cutoff.", "sourceId": "ec-circumvention-20th" } ], "dataGaps": [ "The Council does not publish member-state negotiating positions, so the single most decision-relevant input (which state, if any, is blocking) is unobservable from public sources." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "policy-sequencing-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/policy-sequencing-v1", "sourceIds": [ "eu-council-sanctions", "ec-circumvention-20th" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/eu-21st-sanctions-package-adoption" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-suez-transits-depressed", "slug": "suez-transit-volumes-remain-depressed", "title": "Suez transit volumes remain far below the pre-2024 baseline through 2026", "domain": "shipping", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "reported", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "Suez Canal monthly transit volume relative to its pre-disruption (2023) baseline", "targetEvent": "Suez Canal monthly transits for December 2026 remain at least 25% below the comparable pre-disruption 2023 monthly baseline", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if the Suez Canal Authority's published December 2026 monthly transit count is at least 25% below its published December 2023 count. If SCA figures are unavailable at the resolution date, IMF PortWatch's Suez transit series is the designated fallback, and the same 25% test is applied to it. If neither publishes a comparable figure, the forecast resolves UNRESOLVABLE rather than being scored on a substitute measure.", "resolutionSource": "Suez Canal Authority navigation statistics; IMF PortWatch as designated fallback", "resolutionDate": "2027-01-31", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-09-15", "horizonDays": 197, "probabilityBand": "very-likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 80-95%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "Transit volumes were reported to be running roughly 50-60% below pre-disruption levels through early 2026, leaving a large gap to close within the horizon.", "Carrier routing decisions are made on multi-month planning and insurance cycles, so even a decisive security improvement would take months to show in transit counts.", "Announced partial service resumptions represent a fraction of total pre-disruption traffic." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "Monthly Suez Canal Authority transit counts", "War-risk insurance premium quotes for Red Sea transits", "Whether major carriers (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC) move from partial to default Suez routing" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "A comprehensive, durable security settlement in the Red Sea prompting all major carriers to restore default Suez routing.", "The Suez Canal Authority materially changing how it counts or publishes transits, breaking comparability with the 2023 baseline." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": "Carrier routing intent (CMA CGM's stated Q2 2026 Suez return, Maersk's stepwise approach, Hapag-Lloyd's stated caution) is sourced from freight-forwarder and logistics trade press, which has a commercial interest in freight demand and publishes no primary transit data. It is admitted here because no Tier A body publishes carrier routing intent in near-real-time, and it is used for direction only. Resolution is against the Suez Canal Authority or IMF PortWatch exclusively.", "competingEvidence": [ { "summary": "Evidence toward normalization: several major carriers announced partial or planned Suez service resumptions during the first half of 2026, and trade coverage described a cautious return beginning.", "sourceId": "logistics-trade-press-redsea" }, { "summary": "Evidence toward persistence: the same coverage reports most carriers retained Cape of Good Hope routing as default, with an industry expectation of continued diversions into 2027, and transits still running far below baseline in early 2026.", "sourceId": "logistics-trade-press-redsea" } ], "dataGaps": [ "Warconomy could not directly retrieve a current Suez Canal Authority monthly figure at the cutoff date; the 50-60% depression figure is taken from secondary coverage of SCA data rather than read off the SCA release itself." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "threshold-persistence-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/threshold-persistence-v1", "sourceIds": [ "suez-canal-authority", "imf-portwatch-red-sea", "logistics-trade-press-redsea" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/suez-transit-volumes-remain-depressed" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-eia-brent-revision", "slug": "eia-brent-forecast-revision-direction", "title": "EIA revises its 4Q2026 Brent forecast upward in the August 2026 STEO", "domain": "energy", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "provisional", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "The EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook's published 4Q2026 Brent spot price forecast", "targetEvent": "The August 2026 STEO's 4Q2026 Brent forecast is higher than the July 2026 STEO's figure of $70.00/b", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if the EIA's August 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook publishes a 4Q2026 Brent spot price forecast strictly greater than $70.00/b (the July 2026 STEO value). Resolves FALSE if it is equal to or lower. If the EIA discontinues or restructures the 4Q2026 Brent line item, resolves UNRESOLVABLE.", "resolutionSource": "EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, August 2026 edition", "resolutionDate": "2026-08-31", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-08-12", "horizonDays": 44, "probabilityBand": "likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 60-80%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "The EIA publishes an August 2026 STEO on its normal monthly schedule.", "The July 2026 STEO's forecast was completed on 1 July 2026 and therefore does not incorporate events after that date.", "Reported renewed vessel strikes near the Strait of Hormuz from 7 July 2026 onward, if sustained and verified, represent genuine upward supply-risk information not in the EIA's July cutoff." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "Whether Hormuz vessel-strike reporting is corroborated by state or IMO-affiliated bodies rather than remaining single-sourced", "Kpler-attributed or other daily Hormuz transit counts relative to the reported 38-43/day recovery level", "OPEC+ production announcements before the August STEO cutoff" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "The reported July 2026 Hormuz re-escalation proves to be substantially inaccurate or is quickly and durably resolved.", "A large demand-side shock (a major economic downturn signal) outweighs the supply-risk repricing.", "The EIA changes STEO methodology in a way that moves the published figure for non-market reasons." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": "The core reason to expect an upward revision — renewed Hormuz vessel strikes from 7 July 2026, including a reported ADNOC-operated vessel hit and one reported mariner death — comes from independent transit trackers and news aggregation, NOT from a Tier A body that has published a consolidated verified series. This is explicitly a provisional, partly single-sourced input. It is admitted because the alternative is to ignore the single most decision-relevant development in the gap between the EIA's cutoff and its next release. The forecast's evidenceStatus is 'provisional' for exactly this reason, and it resolves against the EIA's own publication, which is unambiguous.", "competingEvidence": [ { "summary": "Evidence for an upward revision: reported renewed vessel strikes near Hormuz from 7 July 2026, a reported reinstated US Navy blockade posture, and a reported new US toll on cargo transiting the strait — all post-dating the EIA's 1 July cutoff and all supply-restrictive.", "sourceId": "hormuz-crisis-tracking" }, { "summary": "Evidence against: the EIA's July revision was itself large and downward ($95.39/b to $81.91/b for 2026), and the agency noted that markets adjusted trade flows and reduced oil demand faster than it expected — a stated view that supply disruptions are being absorbed more easily than assumed, which could persist into August.", "sourceId": "eia-steo" } ], "dataGaps": [ "No Tier A consolidated series for post-7-July-2026 Hormuz transit levels was located at the cutoff date; the 38-43/day figure is attributed to Kpler via secondary reporting and could not be verified against a primary release." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "external-forecast-tracking-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/external-forecast-tracking-v1", "sourceIds": [ "eia-steo", "hormuz-crisis-tracking" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/eia-brent-forecast-revision-direction" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-sudan-idp-threshold", "slug": "sudan-idp-count-next-dtm-round", "title": "Sudan IDP count stays above 8 million in IOM DTM's next published round", "domain": "humanitarian", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "reported", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "IOM DTM Sudan total internally displaced persons", "targetEvent": "IOM DTM's next published Sudan displacement round reports a national IDP total above 8,000,000", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if the first IOM DTM Sudan displacement/return snapshot published after 18 July 2026 reports a national IDP estimate strictly greater than 8,000,000. Resolves FALSE if it reports 8,000,000 or fewer. If DTM does not publish a national IDP total for Sudan before 31 March 2027, resolves UNRESOLVABLE.", "resolutionSource": "IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Sudan displacement and return snapshots", "resolutionDate": "2027-03-31", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-10-15", "horizonDays": 256, "probabilityBand": "very-likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 80-95%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "DTM's 29 March 2026 round recorded an estimated 8,936,175 IDPs, leaving roughly 936,000 of headroom above the 8 million threshold.", "The observed decline from the 11,585,384 peak has been gradual rather than abrupt, and roughly 350,000 people were newly displaced between October 2025 and March 2026 — meaning returns and new displacement partly offset.", "DTM continues publishing a comparable national IDP total." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "New displacement reporting from Al Fasher, North Darfur, the Kordofan region, and Blue Nile state", "DTM return-figure growth relative to new-displacement figures", "Any ceasefire or humanitarian-access agreement that would accelerate returns" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "A comprehensive ceasefire prompting mass returns at a pace far exceeding the observed trend.", "IOM DTM changing its Sudan displacement methodology or geographic coverage in a way that breaks comparability." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": null, "competingEvidence": [], "dataGaps": [ "DTM publication timing is irregular, so the resolution date is set generously; a long gap between rounds is the main unresolvability risk.", "Access constraints in active-conflict areas of Darfur and Kordofan limit direct verification of any sub-national component." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [ "he-sudan-idp-2025-10" ], "nowcastInputIds": [ "nc-sudan-idp-2026-q2" ], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "trend-continuation-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/trend-continuation-v1", "sourceIds": [ "iom-dtm-sudan" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": "fc-sudan-idp-2026-12", "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/sudan-idp-count-next-dtm-round" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-ukraine-civilian-casualty-trend", "slug": "ukraine-civilian-casualty-monthly-trend", "title": "OHCHR reports at least one month in H2 2026 above the H1 2026 monthly average", "domain": "conflict", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "reported", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "OHCHR/HRMMU monthly verified civilian casualties in Ukraine (killed plus injured)", "targetEvent": "At least one month between July and December 2026 records verified civilian casualties above the January-June 2026 monthly average of roughly 1,562", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if OHCHR/HRMMU's published monthly Protection of Civilians reporting shows any single month from July 2026 through December 2026 with total verified civilian casualties (killed + injured) exceeding 1,562 — the H1 2026 monthly average derived from OHCHR's reported 1,396 killed and 7,978 injured across six months. Resolves FALSE if no month in that window exceeds it. Resolves UNRESOLVABLE if OHCHR ceases monthly publication.", "resolutionSource": "OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, monthly Protection of Civilians reporting", "resolutionDate": "2027-02-15", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-09-15", "horizonDays": 212, "probabilityBand": "very-likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 80-95%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "OHCHR reported June 2026 (293 killed, 1,990 injured — 2,283 total) as the highest monthly total since April 2022, already well above the H1 average.", "OHCHR described a month-on-month escalatory trend through H1 2026, attributing it substantially to increased long-range missile and drone use in urban areas.", "OHCHR continues its monthly publication cadence." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "OHCHR's monthly Protection of Civilians releases", "Reported intensity of long-range strike campaigns against urban areas", "Any ceasefire or negotiated pause in long-range strikes" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "A ceasefire or negotiated halt to long-range strikes on urban areas.", "OHCHR changing its verification methodology or losing the access needed to publish comparable monthly figures." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": null, "competingEvidence": [], "dataGaps": [ "OHCHR verifies only what it can access and states the real toll is considerably higher, so this series is a documented floor rather than a total — the forecast is about the published series, not about actual harm." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "trend-continuation-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/trend-continuation-v1", "sourceIds": [ "ohchr-hrmmu-ukraine" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/ukraine-civilian-casualty-monthly-trend" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-ukraine-reconstruction-estimate", "slug": "ukraine-reconstruction-needs-next-assessment", "title": "The next Ukraine RDNA raises the ten-year reconstruction estimate above $588 billion", "domain": "macro", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "reported", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "Total ten-year Ukraine recovery and reconstruction needs, RDNA series", "targetEvent": "The next published RDNA edition estimates total ten-year needs above $588 billion", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if the next Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment edition published after 18 July 2026 by the World Bank Group with the Government of Ukraine, European Commission and UN states total recovery and reconstruction needs strictly greater than $588 billion in nominal US dollars. Resolves FALSE if the figure is equal or lower. Resolves UNRESOLVABLE if no new RDNA edition is published before 31 December 2027, or if the successor assessment changes units or scope so that no comparable total exists.", "resolutionSource": "World Bank Group Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) series press release and report", "resolutionDate": "2027-12-31", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-12-15", "horizonDays": 531, "probabilityBand": "very-likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 80-95%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "RDNA5 (published 23 February 2026, data as of 31 December 2025) put ten-year needs at almost $588 billion, up from RDNA4's lower figure — the series has risen at each successive edition.", "Direct damage rose from over $176 billion (RDNA4) to over $195 billion (RDNA5), and hostilities have continued since the RDNA5 data cutoff.", "Successive editions keep a broadly comparable ten-year needs definition." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "Continued strikes on energy, transport and housing — the three largest RDNA5 needs sectors", "Announcement of an RDNA6 assessment exercise", "Nominal-dollar construction cost inflation in Ukraine, which raises needs independently of new damage" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "A durable ceasefire early enough that new damage is minimal and cost inflation is offset.", "A methodology change that narrows scope (e.g. shortening the recovery window from ten years) and mechanically lowers the headline." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": null, "competingEvidence": [], "dataGaps": [ "No RDNA6 publication date has been announced, making the resolution timing uncertain — this is the main unresolvability risk and the reason for a generous resolution date." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "trend-continuation-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/trend-continuation-v1", "sourceIds": [ "worldbank-rdna5", "worldbank" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/ukraine-reconstruction-needs-next-assessment" }, { "id": "fc-2026-07-18-hormuz-transits-below-prewar", "slug": "hormuz-transits-below-prewar-level", "title": "Strait of Hormuz daily transits stay below pre-crisis levels through October 2026", "domain": "shipping", "epistemicClass": "forecast", "evidenceStatus": "provisional", "status": "active", "isHindcast": false, "targetVariable": "Strait of Hormuz average daily ship transits", "targetEvent": "Average daily Hormuz ship transits during October 2026 remain below 100 per day (the reported pre-crisis level)", "resolutionCriteria": "Resolves TRUE if a named commercial or institutional transit-tracking source (IMF PortWatch, Kpler, or an equivalent publishing a Hormuz daily-transit series) reports an October 2026 average below 100 ship transits per day. Resolves FALSE if the reported average is 100 or above. Because no Tier A body currently publishes a consolidated verified Hormuz daily-transit series, this forecast resolves UNRESOLVABLE if no such source publishes a comparable October 2026 average — and Warconomy will record it as unresolvable rather than substituting a weaker proxy.", "resolutionSource": "IMF PortWatch or a named commercial transit tracker publishing a Hormuz daily-transit series", "resolutionDate": "2026-11-30", "issueDate": "2026-07-18", "dataCutoffDate": "2026-07-18", "nextReviewDate": "2026-08-31", "horizonDays": 135, "probabilityBand": "likely", "probabilityBandMeaning": "roughly 60-80%", "centralEstimate": null, "interval": null, "assumptions": [ "Pre-crisis Hormuz traffic was reported at more than 100 ships per day; the post-MOU recovery was reported at only 38-43 daily transits.", "The 17-18 June 2026 U.S.-Iran memorandum initiated a 60-day negotiating window rather than a settled permanent arrangement, and its terms over control of the strait were reported as contested.", "Reported renewed vessel strikes from 7 July 2026 suppress rather than accelerate a return to normal traffic." ], "leadingIndicators": [ "Whether the 60-day negotiating window from the June memorandum produces a permanent agreement", "War-risk insurance availability and pricing for Gulf transits", "Whether reported vessel strikes continue past July 2026" ], "invalidationConditions": [ "A permanent U.S.-Iran settlement with verified free transit and a rapid traffic normalization.", "Evidence that the reported July 2026 strike escalation was substantially inaccurate.", "No tracking source publishing a comparable October 2026 figure (resolves unresolvable, not false)." ], "weakSourceDisclosure": "This forecast rests more heavily on weak sources than any other in the archive. Both the pre-crisis 100+/day baseline and the 38-43/day recovery figure come from news aggregation and independent trackers citing Kpler, not from a primary institutional release Warconomy could read directly. Reported details of the July 2026 escalation (an ADNOC vessel hit, a mariner death, a reinstated blockade posture, a new US transit toll) are single- or thinly-sourced. They are admitted because Hormuz is economically central and no Tier A body publishes a timely consolidated series — but the forecast is marked 'provisional', and it is designed to resolve UNRESOLVABLE rather than be scored against a weak proxy if no credible tracker publishes.", "competingEvidence": [ { "summary": "Evidence toward normalization: the June 2026 memorandum did produce a real, measurable traffic recovery to a reported 38-43 daily transits, and the EIA judged the reopening significant enough to cut its 2026 Brent forecast by roughly $13/b.", "sourceId": "eia-steo" }, { "summary": "Evidence toward persistence: reported strikes resumed 7 July 2026 and escalated 11-13 July, with the interim arrangement's terms reportedly contested by Tehran — suggesting the recovery was fragile rather than durable.", "sourceId": "hormuz-crisis-tracking" } ], "dataGaps": [ "No Tier A consolidated Hormuz daily-transit series exists that Warconomy can read directly — the single largest gap in this forecast, and the reason its resolution criteria explicitly permit an unresolvable outcome." ], "reconstructedInputIds": [], "nowcastInputIds": [], "baselineComparison": null, "methodologyId": "threshold-persistence-v1", "modelVersion": "1.0", "modelCardPath": "/methods/models/threshold-persistence-v1", "sourceIds": [ "hormuz-crisis-tracking", "eia-steo" ], "supersededByForecastId": null, "supersedesForecastId": null, "revisionNote": null, "resolution": null, "page": "https://warconomy.com/forecasts/hormuz-transits-below-prewar-level" } ] }