Forecast · Shipping & chokepoints

Strait of Hormuz daily transits stay below the PortWatch peacetime baseline through October 2026

IMF PortWatch's average daily Hormuz transit calls for October 2026 remain below 88 per day (its stated peacetime baseline)

ForecastReportedactiveIssued · data through threshold-persistence-v1 v1.1
Warconomy forecastvery likely (roughly 80-95%)roughly 80-95% — see how bands are defined
Issued
Data cutoff
Horizon
135 days
Resolves by
Next review
Epistemic class
Forecast (modeled, not observed)
Evidence status
reported

How this resolves

Resolves TRUE if IMF PortWatch's published daily Hormuz transit-call series averages below 88 calls per day across October 2026. Resolves FALSE if the October 2026 average is 88 or above. PortWatch is the sole deciding source: no news report, tracker, or commercial estimate may substitute for it. If PortWatch discontinues the Hormuz series or changes its transit-call definition incompatibly, this resolves UNRESOLVABLE rather than being scored against a different measure.

Resolution source: IMF PortWatch daily chokepoint transit calls, Strait of Hormuz series

Assumptions

  • PortWatch's stated peacetime Hormuz baseline is roughly 88 commercial vessel transits per day.
  • Reporting citing PortWatch recorded as few as 10 transits on 12 July 2026, far below that baseline — a much deeper disruption than the 38-43/day figure circulating in general news coverage.
  • The 17-18 June 2026 U.S.-Iran memorandum opened a 60-day negotiating window rather than a settled arrangement, and reported vessel strikes resumed from 7 July 2026.
  • War-risk insurance and routing decisions unwind over months, not days, even after a security improvement.

Leading indicators to watch

  • IMF PortWatch's weekly update to the Hormuz daily transit-call series
  • Whether the 60-day negotiating window from the June memorandum produces a permanent agreement
  • War-risk insurance availability and pricing for Gulf transits

What would make this wrong

  • A permanent U.S.-Iran settlement with verified free transit and a rapid return of traffic to the ~88/day baseline.
  • PortWatch revising its stated peacetime baseline materially upward or downward.
  • PortWatch discontinuing the Hormuz series (resolves unresolvable, not false).

Weak-source disclosure

This forecast now resolves against IMF PortWatch, an institutional dataset — a genuine upgrade over its superseded predecessor, which had no eligible resolution source at all. Weak sources are still present but demoted to context only: the reported details of the July 2026 escalation (an ADNOC-operated vessel hit, a reported mariner death, a reinstated blockade posture) remain single- or thinly-sourced news aggregation and cannot decide this forecast. A residual provenance caveat applies even to the strong source: PortWatch's dashboards are JavaScript-rendered, so the 88/day baseline and the 12 July figure were read from reporting citing PortWatch rather than transcribed from the dashboard directly. PortWatch itself also warns that AIS in conflict zones is degraded by GPS jamming, spoofing, and vessels going dark, so its counts likely understate real traffic — a bias that runs AGAINST this forecast resolving TRUE, which is the conservative direction.

Competing evidence

Credible sources point in different directions here. Both readings are shown rather than averaged into a single false number.

  • Evidence toward normalization: the June 2026 memorandum produced a real, measurable traffic recovery, and the EIA judged the reopening significant enough to cut its 2026 Brent forecast by roughly $13/b. EIA — Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO)
  • Evidence toward persistence: reporting citing PortWatch put transits at roughly 10 on 12 July 2026 against an ~88/day baseline, and strikes reportedly resumed from 7 July — suggesting the June recovery was fragile. IMF PortWatch — daily chokepoint transit calls and trade volume

Known data gaps

  • Warconomy could not transcribe PortWatch's Hormuz series directly (JavaScript dashboard); the baseline and recent readings come from reporting citing PortWatch. Reading the CSV/API export directly is the outstanding hardening step.
  • PortWatch's own AIS-degradation caveat in conflict zones means the true transit count is uncertain in an unquantified direction.

Version history

Methodology

Asks whether something that is currently disrupted will still be disrupted by a certain date, on the reasoning that shipping and insurance decisions unwind slowly.

Uncertainty: Coarse probability band reflecting how far the current value sits from the threshold relative to its recent volatility.

Validation: Resolved against the named publishing authority's own figure at the resolution date. Baseline: 'persistence' (assume today's state simply continues), which this model must beat to be worth running.

Full model card: Threshold persistence v1.0.

Sources

SourceTypeLink
IMF PortWatch — daily chokepoint transit calls and trade volumeIntergovernmentalportwatch.imf.org/pages/data-and-methodology
Open-source Strait of Hormuz transit tracking and news aggregationIndustryglobal-energy-flow.com/hormuz/
EIA — Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO)Officialwww.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/

All forecast fields (accessible table)

Every field of this forecast record, as published.

FieldValue
Forecast IDfc-2026-07-18b-hormuz-transits-portwatch
Target variableStrait of Hormuz average daily ship transit calls (IMF PortWatch basis)
Target eventIMF PortWatch's average daily Hormuz transit calls for October 2026 remain below 88 per day (its stated peacetime baseline)
Predictionvery likely (roughly 80-95%)
Issue date2026-07-18
Data cutoff2026-07-18
Horizon (days)135
Resolution date2026-11-30
Resolution sourceIMF PortWatch daily chokepoint transit calls, Strait of Hormuz series
Statusactive
Epistemic classforecast
Evidence statusreported
Modelthreshold-persistence-v1 v1.1
HindcastNo

Machine-readable: /forecasts/data.json

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