{"id":"fact-ukr-energy","statement":"The war is associated with significant disruption to European energy supply and a reordering of oil and gas trade flows.","subjectType":"conflict","subjectId":"russia-ukraine","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"iea","sourceTitle":"International Energy Agency — International Energy Agency","sourceUrl":"https://www.iea.org"}
{"id":"fact-ukr-food","statement":"Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of grain, oilseeds, and fertilizer inputs, so disruptions are tracked alongside global food-price pressure.","subjectType":"conflict","subjectId":"russia-ukraine","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"fao","sourceTitle":"Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations — Food and Agriculture Organization","sourceUrl":"https://www.fao.org"}
{"id":"fact-ukr-reconstruction","statement":"The Government of Ukraine, World Bank, European Commission, and UN estimate reconstruction and recovery needs at about USD 524 billion over the next decade, as of December 2024 (RDNA4); such estimates are periodically revised.","subjectType":"conflict","subjectId":"russia-ukraine","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"wb-rdna4","sourceTitle":"Government of Ukraine, World Bank Group, European Commission, and United Nations — Ukraine — Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4)","sourceUrl":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/25/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released"}
{"id":"fact-ukr-support","statement":"Allied financial, humanitarian, and military support to Ukraine has been tracked cumulatively by independent researchers.","subjectType":"conflict","subjectId":"russia-ukraine","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"kse","sourceTitle":"Kiel Institute (Ukraine Support Tracker) — Kiel Institute for the World Economy","sourceUrl":"https://www.ifw-kiel.de"}
{"id":"fact-hormuz-chokepoint","statement":"The Strait of Hormuz is described as the world's most important oil transit chokepoint, with limited alternative pipeline capacity.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"strait-of-hormuz","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — U.S. Energy Information Administration","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov"}
{"id":"fact-hormuz-price","statement":"Perceived transit risk in the strait is commonly tracked alongside movements in crude oil benchmark prices.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"strait-of-hormuz","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — U.S. Energy Information Administration","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov"}
{"id":"fact-redsea-route","statement":"The Red Sea corridor is a primary Europe–Asia trade route; reduced transits are associated with diversions around the Cape of Good Hope.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"red-sea-shipping","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"unctad","sourceTitle":"UNCTAD — UN Conference on Trade and Development","sourceUrl":"https://unctad.org"}
{"id":"fact-redsea-cost","statement":"Longer reroutes are associated with higher freight costs, increased fuel use, and longer delivery lead times.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"red-sea-shipping","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"unctad","sourceTitle":"UNCTAD — UN Conference on Trade and Development","sourceUrl":"https://unctad.org"}
{"id":"fact-redsea-sca-recovery","statement":"Suez Canal Authority statistics reported 12,758 vessels transiting in 2025 (524.5 million net tons), down from 13,213 vessels (522.1 million tons) in 2024 — a partial, uneven recovery still below pre-disruption levels, with container-ship transits reported about 18% lower year over year.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"red-sea-shipping","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"sca","sourceTitle":"Suez Canal Authority — Suez Canal Authority — Navigation statistics","sourceUrl":"https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Navigation/Pages/NavigationStatistics.aspx"}
{"id":"fact-redsea-rmt2024","statement":"UNCTAD's Review of Maritime Transport 2024 reported that by mid-2024 tonnage transiting the Suez Canal was down about 70% while Cape of Good Hope traffic rose about 89%, as vessels diverted around Africa — a newer official assessment that complements the February 2024 rapid assessment.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"red-sea-shipping","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"unctad-rmt-2024","sourceTitle":"UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) — UNCTAD — Review of Maritime Transport 2024","sourceUrl":"https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2024"}
{"id":"fact-panama-tonnage","statement":"The Panama Canal Authority reported about 423 million tons transited in fiscal year 2024, down from prior years as drought-driven draft and slot restrictions cut traffic.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"panama-canal","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"panama-canal-authority","sourceTitle":"Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamá) — Panama Canal Authority — FY2024 financial and traffic results","sourceUrl":"https://pancanal.com/en/presents-financial-results-for-fy24-with-a-focus-on-sustainability-and-the-future/"}
{"id":"fact-panama-drought","statement":"A severe 2023–2024 drought forced the canal to cut daily transit slots and draft, reducing FY2024 deep-draft transits about 29% versus FY2023 — a freshwater-availability constraint rather than a security disruption.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"panama-canal","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"panama-canal-authority","sourceTitle":"Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamá) — Panama Canal Authority — FY2024 financial and traffic results","sourceUrl":"https://pancanal.com/en/presents-financial-results-for-fy24-with-a-focus-on-sustainability-and-the-future/"}
{"id":"fact-malacca-rank","statement":"After the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca is the world's busiest oil transit chokepoint by volume, carrying crude and petroleum products toward East Asian markets.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"strait-of-malacca","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-steo-chokepoints","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php"}
{"id":"fact-babelmandeb-diversion","statement":"Red Sea security disruption since late 2023 has pushed many tankers off the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez route onto the longer voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, lowering oil flows through the strait.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"bab-el-mandeb","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-steo-chokepoints","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php"}
{"id":"fact-turkish-crude","statement":"Flows through the Turkish Straits are predominantly crude oil moving from Russian, Caspian, and Black Sea ports toward the Mediterranean and world markets.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"turkish-straits","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-steo-chokepoints","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php"}
{"id":"fact-danish-route","statement":"The Danish Straits are a primary outlet for seaborne Russian and Baltic crude and petroleum-product exports to global markets, making them central to sanctions and shadow-fleet attention in the Baltic.","subjectType":"chokepoint","subjectId":"danish-straits","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-steo-chokepoints","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php"}
{"id":"fact-oil-benchmarks","statement":"Brent and WTI are the two most-watched crude oil benchmarks; the Brent–WTI spread reflects differences between waterborne international crude and U.S. landlocked crude. Warconomy tracks them as market benchmarks alongside conflict and chokepoint risk, not as causal attributions.","subjectType":"commodity","subjectId":"oil-benchmarks","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-spot-prices","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA — Spot Prices for Crude Oil (Brent & WTI)","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm"}
{"id":"fact-natural-gas","statement":"Henry Hub is the U.S. natural gas benchmark; European and Asian gas benchmarks (e.g. TTF, JKM) can move very differently, so a single gas price does not capture the global market. Tracked as a benchmark, not a causal attribution.","subjectType":"commodity","subjectId":"natural-gas","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eia-henry-hub","sourceTitle":"U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA — Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (monthly)","sourceUrl":"https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm"}
{"id":"fact-food-prices","statement":"The FAO Food Price Index is a trade-weighted basket of five sub-indices (cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, meat, sugar). It is a global benchmark of international food-commodity prices, tracked alongside the food-security channel of conflict and trade disruption — not a measure of any single event's impact.","subjectType":"commodity","subjectId":"food-prices","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"fao-fpi","sourceTitle":"Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations — FAO — Food Price Index (monthly)","sourceUrl":"https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/"}
{"id":"fact-defense-global-2024","statement":"SIPRI reports world military expenditure reached US$2,718 billion in 2024, a 9.4% increase that was the steepest year-on-year rise since at least 1988 — the predecessor point to the 2025 total.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"defense-spending","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"sipri-milex-2024","sourceTitle":"Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024","sourceUrl":"https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2024"}
{"id":"fact-defense-global","statement":"SIPRI reports that world military expenditure rose for the eleventh consecutive year in 2025, continuing a sustained multi-year increase.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"defense-spending","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"sipri-milex-2025","sourceTitle":"Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025","sourceUrl":"https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2025"}
{"id":"fact-defense-top3","statement":"SIPRI reports the top three spenders — the United States, China, and Russia — spent a combined US$1,480 billion in 2025, about 51% of the global total.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"defense-spending","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"sipri-milex-2025","sourceTitle":"Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025","sourceUrl":"https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2025"}
{"id":"fact-defense-top5","statement":"SIPRI reports the five biggest spenders in 2025 — the United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India — together accounted for 58% of world military spending.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"defense-spending","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"sipri-milex-2025","sourceTitle":"Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025","sourceUrl":"https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2025"}
{"id":"fact-shipping-risk","statement":"Maritime disruption risk varies across chokepoints; UNCTAD reports on trade and transport impacts of such disruptions.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"global-shipping-risk","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"unctad","sourceTitle":"UNCTAD — UN Conference on Trade and Development","sourceUrl":"https://unctad.org"}
{"id":"fact-sanctions-cap-history","statement":"The G7, EU, and Australia first set the price cap on seaborne Russian crude oil at US$60 per barrel, applicable from 5 December 2022; the EU subsequently lowered its cap to a dynamic level — US$47.6 per barrel under the 18th package, then US$44.10 per barrel from 1 February 2026 — while the United States continued to apply the original US$60 level.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"russia-energy-trade","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-crude-cap-2026","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — Dynamic mechanism lowers the Russian crude oil price cap to US$44.10/bbl","sourceUrl":"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/new-dynamic-mechanism-lower-price-cap-russian-crude-oil-4410-barrel-2026-01-15_en"}
{"id":"fact-sanctions-us-cap","statement":"The U.S. Treasury reports that the G7-led Price Cap Coalition set the price cap on seaborne Russian-origin crude oil at US$60 per barrel, effective 5 December 2022, via an OFAC determination under Executive Order 14071; the United States continued to apply the US$60 level after the EU adopted a lower dynamic cap. It is a policy threshold for covered services, not a market price, and not legal or compliance advice.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"russia-energy-trade","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"us-treasury-russia-price-cap","sourceTitle":"U.S. Department of the Treasury (OFAC) — U.S. Department of the Treasury — Price cap on Russian oil (US$60/bbl crude)","sourceUrl":"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1141"}
{"id":"fact-sanctions-products-cap","statement":"EU price caps on seaborne Russian refined products have applied since 5 February 2023, at US$100 per barrel for premium-to-crude products (e.g. diesel, kerosene, gasoline) and US$45 per barrel for discount-to-crude products (e.g. fuel oil, naphtha).","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"russia-energy-trade","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-sanctions-energy","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — EU sanctions against Russia: energy (oil price cap)","sourceUrl":"https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-energy_en"}
{"id":"fact-sanctions-gas-diversification","statement":"Under REPowerEU, the European Commission reported that the EU dropped its share of Russian gas imports from 45% to 19%, with a partial rebound in 2024, and set out a roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"russia-energy-trade","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-repowereu","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — Roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy (REPowerEU)","sourceUrl":"https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/roadmap-fully-end-eu-dependency-russian-energy-2025-05-06_en"}
{"id":"fact-sanctions-revenue","statement":"The IEA tracks Russia's oil export revenues, which it has reported declining over 2025 as discounted Urals prices and tighter sanctions weighed on receipts; revenue and rerouting estimates are associative and not a causal attribution to any single measure.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"russia-energy-trade","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"iea","sourceTitle":"International Energy Agency — International Energy Agency","sourceUrl":"https://www.iea.org"}
{"id":"fact-shadow-eu-listings","statement":"The EU lists shadow-fleet vessels in successive sanctions packages; with the 20th package (23 April 2026) the cumulative list reached 632 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet (up from 557 after the 19th package), subject to port-access and maritime-service bans, with vessels both added and occasionally delisted.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"shadow-fleet-shipping-insurance","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"eu-council-shadow-fleet","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission / Council of the EU — 20th sanctions package (shadow-fleet vessel listings)","sourceUrl":"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en"}
{"id":"fact-shadow-crea-opacity","statement":"CREA has identified a 'shadow'/'dark' tanker fleet that obscures Russian oil trade through practices such as ship-to-ship transfers and gaps in vessel-tracking signals; such estimates vary by methodology and are not directly comparable across sources.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"shadow-fleet-shipping-insurance","confidence":"medium","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"crea-shadow-tankers","sourceTitle":"Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) — CREA — Shedding light on shadow tankers","sourceUrl":"https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/shedding-light-on-shadow-tankers/"}
{"id":"fact-frozen-immobilized","statement":"The EU reports that around €260 billion of Central Bank of Russia assets are immobilized worldwide, with more than two-thirds (about €210 billion) in the EU; in December 2025 the EU decided to keep them immobilized indefinitely. The assets are immobilized, not confiscated.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-financing","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"consilium-russia-sanctions","sourceTitle":"Council of the European Union — Council of the EU — Russia's war against Ukraine: EU sanctions (immobilised assets)","sourceUrl":"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/"}
{"id":"fact-frozen-proceeds","statement":"G7 ERA loans for Ukraine are repaid from the extraordinary revenues/windfall proceeds generated by immobilized Russian assets — not the principal assets themselves; the European Commission estimates these revenues at up to €2.5–3 billion a year.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-financing","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-era-loan","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — EU's €18.1 billion contribution to the G7 ERA loans (first €3 billion tranche)","sourceUrl":"https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-first-eu3-billion-ukraine-its-part-g7-loan-be-repaid-proceeds-immobilised-2025-01-10_en"}
{"id":"fact-frozen-us-disbursement","statement":"The U.S. Treasury disbursed a US$20 billion loan to benefit Ukraine as part of the US$50 billion G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loan initiative, to be repaid with proceeds from immobilized Russian sovereign assets.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-financing","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"us-treasury-era","sourceTitle":"U.S. Department of the Treasury — U.S. Department of the Treasury — Disbursement of $20 billion ERA loan to benefit Ukraine","sourceUrl":"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2744"}
{"id":"fact-circumvention-kyrgyzstan","statement":"With its 20th sanctions package (23 April 2026) the EU activated its anti-circumvention tool against a third country for the first time, restricting exports of certain machine tools and telecommunications equipment to the Kyrgyz Republic over re-export risk to Russia.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"secondary-sanctions-circumvention","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-circumvention-20th","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — 20th sanctions package (military-industrial & circumvention listings)","sourceUrl":"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en"}
{"id":"fact-circumvention-thirdcountry","statement":"Of the 60 entities the EU listed in its 20th package for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex or circumvention, 28 are established in third countries (including China, the UAE and Türkiye) — illustrating the third-country routing channel.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"secondary-sanctions-circumvention","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-circumvention-20th","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — 20th sanctions package (military-industrial & circumvention listings)","sourceUrl":"https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en"}
{"id":"fact-circumvention-chpl","statement":"The EU, US, UK, and Japan jointly maintain a Common High Priority Items list of battlefield/dual-use goods (50 HS codes as of February 2024) that Russia seeks to procure, used to focus export-control and circumvention-enforcement efforts.","subjectType":"sanctions","subjectId":"secondary-sanctions-circumvention","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"ec-chpl","sourceTitle":"European Commission — European Commission — Common High Priority Items list (with the US, UK and Japan)","sourceUrl":"https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-partners-expand-list-common-high-priority-items-further-weaken-russias-war-effort-2024-02-23_en"}
{"id":"fact-shipping-imf","statement":"IMF PortWatch reported that the volume of trade transiting the Suez Canal fell by about 50% year over year in the first two months of 2024, while trade rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope rose by an estimated 74% — a reminder that chokepoint disruptions can reroute traffic rather than simply reduce global trade.","subjectType":"dashboard","subjectId":"global-shipping-risk","confidence":"high","dataMode":"sample","contested":false,"sourceId":"imf-portwatch-red-sea","sourceTitle":"International Monetary Fund — IMF PortWatch — Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade","sourceUrl":"https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/03/07/red-sea-attacks-disrupt-global-trade"}