statement: The war is associated with significant disruption to European energy supply and a reordering of oil and gas trade flows.

subjectType: conflict

subjectId: russia-ukraine

confidence: high

dataMode: sample

sourceId: iea

sourceTitle: International Energy Agency — International Energy Agency


statement: Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of grain, oilseeds, and fertilizer inputs, so disruptions are tracked alongside global food-price pressure.

sourceId: fao

sourceTitle: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations — Food and Agriculture Organization


statement: The Government of Ukraine, World Bank, European Commission, and UN estimate reconstruction and recovery needs at about USD 524 billion over the next decade, as of December 2024 (RDNA4); such estimates are periodically revised.

confidence: medium

sourceTitle: Government of Ukraine, World Bank Group, European Commission, and United Nations — Ukraine — Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4)


statement: Allied financial, humanitarian, and military support to Ukraine has been tracked cumulatively by independent researchers.

sourceId: kse

sourceTitle: Kiel Institute (Ukraine Support Tracker) — Kiel Institute for the World Economy


statement: The Strait of Hormuz is described as the world's most important oil transit chokepoint, with limited alternative pipeline capacity.

subjectType: chokepoint

subjectId: strait-of-hormuz

sourceId: eia

sourceTitle: U.S. Energy Information Administration — U.S. Energy Information Administration


statement: Perceived transit risk in the strait is commonly tracked alongside movements in crude oil benchmark prices.


statement: The Red Sea corridor is a primary Europe–Asia trade route; reduced transits are associated with diversions around the Cape of Good Hope.

subjectId: red-sea-shipping

sourceId: unctad

sourceTitle: UNCTAD — UN Conference on Trade and Development


statement: Longer reroutes are associated with higher freight costs, increased fuel use, and longer delivery lead times.


statement: Suez Canal Authority statistics reported 12,758 vessels transiting in 2025 (524.5 million net tons), down from 13,213 vessels (522.1 million tons) in 2024 — a partial, uneven recovery still below pre-disruption levels, with container-ship transits reported about 18% lower year over year.

sourceId: sca

sourceTitle: Suez Canal Authority — Suez Canal Authority — Navigation statistics


statement: UNCTAD's Review of Maritime Transport 2024 reported that by mid-2024 tonnage transiting the Suez Canal was down about 70% while Cape of Good Hope traffic rose about 89%, as vessels diverted around Africa — a newer official assessment that complements the February 2024 rapid assessment.

sourceTitle: UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) — UNCTAD — Review of Maritime Transport 2024


statement: The Panama Canal Authority reported about 423 million tons transited in fiscal year 2024, down from prior years as drought-driven draft and slot restrictions cut traffic.

subjectId: panama-canal

sourceId: panama-canal-authority

sourceTitle: Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamá) — Panama Canal Authority — FY2024 financial and traffic results


statement: A severe 2023–2024 drought forced the canal to cut daily transit slots and draft, reducing FY2024 deep-draft transits about 29% versus FY2023 — a freshwater-availability constraint rather than a security disruption.


statement: After the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca is the world's busiest oil transit chokepoint by volume, carrying crude and petroleum products toward East Asian markets.

subjectId: strait-of-malacca

sourceId: eia-steo-chokepoints

sourceTitle: U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook — energy security / maritime oil chokepoints


statement: Red Sea security disruption since late 2023 has pushed many tankers off the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez route onto the longer voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, lowering oil flows through the strait.

subjectId: bab-el-mandeb


statement: Flows through the Turkish Straits are predominantly crude oil moving from Russian, Caspian, and Black Sea ports toward the Mediterranean and world markets.

subjectId: turkish-straits


statement: The Danish Straits are a primary outlet for seaborne Russian and Baltic crude and petroleum-product exports to global markets, making them central to sanctions and shadow-fleet attention in the Baltic.

subjectId: danish-straits


statement: Brent and WTI are the two most-watched crude oil benchmarks; the Brent–WTI spread reflects differences between waterborne international crude and U.S. landlocked crude. Warconomy tracks them as market benchmarks alongside conflict and chokepoint risk, not as causal attributions.

subjectType: commodity

subjectId: oil-benchmarks

sourceId: eia-spot-prices

sourceTitle: U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA — Spot Prices for Crude Oil (Brent & WTI)


statement: Henry Hub is the U.S. natural gas benchmark; European and Asian gas benchmarks (e.g. TTF, JKM) can move very differently, so a single gas price does not capture the global market. Tracked as a benchmark, not a causal attribution.

subjectId: natural-gas

sourceId: eia-henry-hub

sourceTitle: U.S. Energy Information Administration — EIA — Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (monthly)


statement: The FAO Food Price Index is a trade-weighted basket of five sub-indices (cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, meat, sugar). It is a global benchmark of international food-commodity prices, tracked alongside the food-security channel of conflict and trade disruption — not a measure of any single event's impact.

subjectId: food-prices

sourceId: fao-fpi

sourceTitle: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations — FAO — Food Price Index (monthly)


statement: SIPRI reports world military expenditure reached US$2,718 billion in 2024, a 9.4% increase that was the steepest year-on-year rise since at least 1988 — the predecessor point to the 2025 total.

subjectType: dashboard

subjectId: defense-spending

sourceTitle: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024


statement: SIPRI reports that world military expenditure rose for the eleventh consecutive year in 2025, continuing a sustained multi-year increase.

sourceTitle: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025


statement: SIPRI reports the top three spenders — the United States, China, and Russia — spent a combined US$1,480 billion in 2025, about 51% of the global total.


statement: SIPRI reports the five biggest spenders in 2025 — the United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India — together accounted for 58% of world military spending.


statement: Maritime disruption risk varies across chokepoints; UNCTAD reports on trade and transport impacts of such disruptions.

subjectId: global-shipping-risk


statement: The G7, EU, and Australia first set the price cap on seaborne Russian crude oil at US$60 per barrel, applicable from 5 December 2022; the EU subsequently lowered its cap to a dynamic level — US$47.6 per barrel under the 18th package, then US$44.10 per barrel from 1 February 2026 — while the United States continued to apply the original US$60 level.

subjectType: sanctions

subjectId: russia-energy-trade

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — Dynamic mechanism lowers the Russian crude oil price cap to US$44.10/bbl


statement: The U.S. Treasury reports that the G7-led Price Cap Coalition set the price cap on seaborne Russian-origin crude oil at US$60 per barrel, effective 5 December 2022, via an OFAC determination under Executive Order 14071; the United States continued to apply the US$60 level after the EU adopted a lower dynamic cap. It is a policy threshold for covered services, not a market price, and not legal or compliance advice.

sourceId: us-treasury-russia-price-cap

sourceTitle: U.S. Department of the Treasury (OFAC) — U.S. Department of the Treasury — Price cap on Russian oil (US$60/bbl crude)


statement: EU price caps on seaborne Russian refined products have applied since 5 February 2023, at US$100 per barrel for premium-to-crude products (e.g. diesel, kerosene, gasoline) and US$45 per barrel for discount-to-crude products (e.g. fuel oil, naphtha).

sourceId: ec-sanctions-energy

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — EU sanctions against Russia: energy (oil price cap)


statement: Under REPowerEU, the European Commission reported that the EU dropped its share of Russian gas imports from 45% to 19%, with a partial rebound in 2024, and set out a roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy.

sourceId: ec-repowereu

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — Roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy (REPowerEU)


statement: The IEA tracks Russia's oil export revenues, which it has reported declining over 2025 as discounted Urals prices and tighter sanctions weighed on receipts; revenue and rerouting estimates are associative and not a causal attribution to any single measure.

sourceTitle: International Energy Agency — International Energy Agency


statement: The EU lists shadow-fleet vessels in successive sanctions packages; with the 20th package (23 April 2026) the cumulative list reached 632 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet (up from 557 after the 19th package), subject to port-access and maritime-service bans, with vessels both added and occasionally delisted.

subjectId: shadow-fleet-shipping-insurance

sourceId: eu-council-shadow-fleet

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission / Council of the EU — 20th sanctions package (shadow-fleet vessel listings)


statement: CREA has identified a 'shadow'/'dark' tanker fleet that obscures Russian oil trade through practices such as ship-to-ship transfers and gaps in vessel-tracking signals; such estimates vary by methodology and are not directly comparable across sources.

sourceId: crea-shadow-tankers

sourceTitle: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) — CREA — Shedding light on shadow tankers


statement: The EU reports that around €260 billion of Central Bank of Russia assets are immobilized worldwide, with more than two-thirds (about €210 billion) in the EU; in December 2025 the EU decided to keep them immobilized indefinitely. The assets are immobilized, not confiscated.

subjectId: frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-financing

sourceId: consilium-russia-sanctions

sourceTitle: Council of the European Union — Council of the EU — Russia's war against Ukraine: EU sanctions (immobilised assets)


statement: G7 ERA loans for Ukraine are repaid from the extraordinary revenues/windfall proceeds generated by immobilized Russian assets — not the principal assets themselves; the European Commission estimates these revenues at up to €2.5–3 billion a year.

sourceId: ec-era-loan

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — EU's €18.1 billion contribution to the G7 ERA loans (first €3 billion tranche)


statement: The U.S. Treasury disbursed a US$20 billion loan to benefit Ukraine as part of the US$50 billion G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loan initiative, to be repaid with proceeds from immobilized Russian sovereign assets.

sourceId: us-treasury-era

sourceTitle: U.S. Department of the Treasury — U.S. Department of the Treasury — Disbursement of $20 billion ERA loan to benefit Ukraine


statement: With its 20th sanctions package (23 April 2026) the EU activated its anti-circumvention tool against a third country for the first time, restricting exports of certain machine tools and telecommunications equipment to the Kyrgyz Republic over re-export risk to Russia.

subjectId: secondary-sanctions-circumvention

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — 20th sanctions package (military-industrial & circumvention listings)


statement: Of the 60 entities the EU listed in its 20th package for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex or circumvention, 28 are established in third countries (including China, the UAE and Türkiye) — illustrating the third-country routing channel.


statement: The EU, US, UK, and Japan jointly maintain a Common High Priority Items list of battlefield/dual-use goods (50 HS codes as of February 2024) that Russia seeks to procure, used to focus export-control and circumvention-enforcement efforts.

sourceId: ec-chpl

sourceTitle: European Commission — European Commission — Common High Priority Items list (with the US, UK and Japan)


statement: IMF PortWatch reported that the volume of trade transiting the Suez Canal fell by about 50% year over year in the first two months of 2024, while trade rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope rose by an estimated 74% — a reminder that chokepoint disruptions can reroute traffic rather than simply reduce global trade.

sourceId: imf-portwatch-red-sea

sourceTitle: International Monetary Fund — IMF PortWatch — Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade